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Subsidies
Measures (SCM) and of the GATT 1994. Both proceedings (DS 316 and DS 317/DS 353) are far behind the schedule laid out in WTO guidelines due to their complexity. A confi dential interim WTO report on the Airbus case was issued in September 2009. A fi nal ruling on the Airbus proceedings is expected in the near future; the case against the United States is expected to be resolved approximately half a year after the Airbus decision. Given the importance of the cases, subsequent appeals by both parties seem to be very likely. A fi nal ruling by the WTO Appellate Body would not be issued before 2011/2012. Measuring the level of subsidies in favour of Airbus is a diffi cult undertaking given the complex ownership structure and the multiple functions of aircraft engineering in the civil and military aircraft industry as well as in the aerospace sector.
Governmental, non-repayable grants (direct subsidies) are relatively easy to measure. Indirect subsidies, however, provide the subsidy recipient only with an indirect fi nancial advantage. In the case of Airbus, this includes primarily granting loans with performance-based repayment obligations. Finally, there is also non-monetary support in the aviation sector, as illustrated by the current example of the American tanker aircraft tender.
These problems are joined by other computational problems such as fl uctuating exchange rates and infl ation. In this paper, the nominal values are defl ated for By 2028 global air traffi c is expected to triple, leading to demand in the large civil aircraft segment for up to 17,000 new aircraft with a total value of approximately €1.3 trillion (Airbus Global Market Forecast 2009 -2028 . The battle for this market is understandable -as is the United States' long-standing scepticism about Airbus, the European aviation consortium founded in 1970. Once the US realised that its hopes to stabilise market shares with the TLCA 1 had been off base, the American withdrawal from the agreement did not come unexpectedly.
In the current proceedings before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), both parties claim violations of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing * University of Hamburg. ** University of Hamburg, European University Institute. */** We wish to thank Dorothea Seher for her excellent research support.
1 The scope of the agreement referred to the producers of civil widebody aircraft in the US and the EU. Major provisions of the agreement include the following articles: Art. 3 prohibited production subsidies. Art. 4 allowed direct development subsidies if they do not exceed 33% of the total development cost, are paid back within 17 years from the beginning of the development period and are made subject to interest on fi xed rules. Indirect state aid was limited, under Art. 5, to a maximum of 3% of the annual turnover of the commercial aircraft industry, or to a maximum of 4% of the annual turnover of each company in civil aviation. A precise defi nition of indirect aid, however, was never supplied. Art. 8 regulated the transparency of subsidies, Art. 10 the intention of avoiding confl ict, and Art. 11 the exchange of information, cf. N. DOI: 10.1007/s10272-010-0334-7 Subsidies assumed that it and its partner companies receive part of the subsidies for civil aviation.
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Research Funding by the Airbus Consortium States
Germany
As part of the German Aviation Research Programme (Luftfahrtforschungsprogramm or LuFo), the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) supports the German aviation industry with 40% non-repayable grants for research and technology projects. The rate of funding can be increased to 50% if R&D subcontracts are awarded to SMEs. The German federal states (Länder) are invited to contribute an amount comparable to that of the federal government to the current aviation research programme. Most of the funding goes to pre-competitive research projects, which are based, for each programme, on key concepts that are proposed by the industry. 6 The programme priorities for the LuFo II (1999 -2002 were "mega-liners" (large aircraft with capacity for more than 400 passengers), "all-weather helicopters" and "environmentally friendly propulsion systems". For example, the "megaliners" key concept is credited with creating the scientifi c and technological requirements for the A380, such as a reduction in fuel consumption by 30% and correspondingly lower carbon dioxide emissions. The federal government supported the programme to the tune of €130.2 million 7 . The key concepts of the LuFo III (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , total volume €323 million) included "environmental protection", "fl ight safety" and "effi ciency".
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The focus of the LuFo IV (2007-2012, €330 million) is on developing technologies and engines of the next generation, developing methods for optimising the air transport system, and reducing energy consumption, noise and pollution.
9
Another German source of funding for basic aeronautics research is support for the major research facility 5 Cf. also W. M a e n n i g , K. H ö l z e r : Zur aktuellen Förderung der Airbus-Industrie, in: Wirtschaftsdienst Vol. III, 1999, pp. 191-200. 6 (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , the European aviation and aerospace industries received subsidies of €784 million, representing approximately 4.6% of the total budget of the fi fth programme. 4 Around 300 projects were funded, which means the EU supported about 30% of all civil aeronautics research. The Sixth Framework Programme (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) provided the aviation industry with as much as €857 million in funding. Under the Seventh Framework Programme (2007-2013) -which set security and aerospace research as its new thematic priority and came with a total budget of €50.5 billion -EU subsidies more than doubled for the aviation and aerospace sector, even though the share for the aviation industry in the total funding volume remained relatively constant over time. These funds were granted for R&D support in the aerospace sector in general; direct funding for research on Airbus aircraft was not approved. However, because Airbus/ EADS dominates the European market for civil aircraft and is also active in the aerospace sector, it can be 2 The information source used is the Eurostat database. Table 1 ). The extent to which Airbus Industrie has benefi ted from this has not been disclosed, but it is likely that, apart from Airbus, a large number of its suppliers and sub-suppliers participate directly in R&D subsidy programmes.
United Kingdom
The UK aviation industry -with its turnover of around €26.3 billion (£18.4 billion) in 2005 and an export share of 8% of total exports of industrial products -is among the most successful industries in the UK. 14 The UK's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is the lead agency for R&D funding. As part of the Civil Aircraft Research and Development Programme (CARAD), it funded a total of €229 million of the civil aviation industry's basic and applied research from 1997-2004. Company-specifi c data are not supplied, but as an example, around €5.4 million a year went into the design of airplane wings, which in the UK is conducted almost exclusively by Airbus. 15 After completion of the CARAD programme in 2005, the Technology Programme was launched, which supports both the aviation industry and research projects of other sectors. Nevertheless, the aviation sector now has at its disposal a bigger budget of around €73 million per year. Information on the funds allocated to Airbus projects is not disclosed in this case either.
Spain
The Spanish government has funded R&D projects for the aeronautics industry since 1993 as part of the Plan Tecnológico Aeronáutico I (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) and Plan Tecnológico Aeronáutico II (1999 II ( -2003 , and since 2000 of the German Aerospace Centre (DLR) through the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and by technical programmes of the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development (BM-VBS). The annual research budget is around €220 million. 10 The research results are publicly available at the Technical University of Braunschweig, unless they are derived from private contract research, which currently constitutes 50% of the research. The implicit support for Airbus from this is diffi cult to calculate since Airbus functions both as a "private" client and as a benefi ciary of public research funding, while the public share of contract research is, on principle, also available for other, even non-German, companies.
The German Länder also have their own aviation research and technology programmes. The Hamburg Aviation Research Programme, as part of the "Aviation Cluster Hamburg/Northern Germany" project 11 , mainly funds co-operation projects in order to expand the network of industry, scientifi c institutions and universities on site; its focus is on the fi eld of pre-competitive research.
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Between 2001 and 2005, projects were funded with a total volume of €37.6 million -with about 50% coming from the Hamburg Ministry of Economics and Labour (BWA). Airbus was only directly supported in 4 out of 42 projects, 13 but the SME projects received only half of the funding. Moreover, Airbus is likely to benefi t indirectly, as the main regional contractors and benefi ciaries work with Airbus. By 2010, the City of Hamburg had With this form of fi nancing, a (fee-based) Hermes cover was granted at an interest rate equivalent to the LIBOR rate plus a margin. Losses from the Hermes cover that exceeded revenue were offset by the German federal government, which constituted a subsidy for the cover premium. In the period 2000-2006, approximately €240 million was provided by the federal government (see line 2, Table 2 ).
The support from the UK government in 2000-2004 amounted to only €22.6 million. Since the elimination of LASU fi nancing, no further export credit fi nancing has been provided (DTI, various years). Data on French export support are not disclosed and cannot be accessed.
Financing from the European Investment Bank (EIB)
Through partial funding of investment projects (generally up to 50% of the purchase price), the European Investment Bank (EIB) funded the renewal of passenger aircraft fl eets, which was usually accompanied by capacity expansions. The bulk of its fi nancing portfolio (about 65%) went to state-owned airlines that usually hold a dominant position in each market. The carriers 
Export Financing
Since 1975, Germany, France and the UK have provided export credit support in the form of interest rate subsidies.
17 In Germany, export credit guarantees are provided and monitored by the Euler Hermes Kreditversicherungs AG (Hermesdeckungen); in France, this is done by the Compagnie Française d'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur (COFACE); and in the UK, by the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD). These export credit agencies (ECA) serve to maintain economic relations and to exploit rather diffi cult markets. Exports to all OECD countries, developing countries as well as the CIS and CEE countries can be hedged.
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Export guarantees and public loans reduce the capital cost of the buyers and aim to ensure the competitiveness of Airbus aircraft versus Boeing, which has long benefi ted from a similar practice.
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There are two kinds of European export fi nancing for large civil aircraft: for Large Aircraft Sector Under- Subsidies with subsidised interest rates, which are redeemable only if the recipient is economically successful, thus avoiding threatening the company's existence. The European Commission approves these loans with reference to Article 87.3 of the EC Treaty, which recognises state aid as being compatible with the common market if and when it helps to support important projects of common European interest. 25 The loans that have been given out in recent years were structured according to the provisions of the bilateral Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (TLCA). According to this agreement, the ceiling of government support was fi xed to a maximum of 33% of the total development costs, and the loans had to be provided with an interest rate that would at least cover the loan costs of the government. Furthermore, public support of the capital-intensive development costs results in a more favourable credit rating, which in turn leads to reduced borrowing costs on capital markets, thereby constituting another fi nancial advantage.
Since 1990, three of the eight Airbus programmes have been supported by the consortium states (A320, A330/340 and A380). By early 1999, Airbus Deutschland GmbH had repaid all Launch Aid grants previously received.
The A380 Project
The level of Launch Aid for the A380 project from the Airbus consortium member states amounted to €3.5 billion, of which Germany contributed €1.06 billion. Within the fi rst year (2002), as much as 78% of the total amount had already been disbursed. For the following calculations, a uniform distribution of payments over the remaining years was assumed, i.e. around €37 million per year. The loan agreement was linked to the obligation to create 500 additional jobs in the new (former East German) federal states. Table 4 ). An additional €65 million was to go to the aviation industry to fi nance its R&D projects. There is no information on the period of payout, which is why these grants have not been considered in this analysis.
are mainly from EU countries, but it also funds projects from outside the EU -increasingly in developing countries. During the observation period, the EIB fi nanced the purchase of aircraft from four manufacturers, with Airbus accounting for a total of €2.4 billion, about 61% of the total grant volume (Table 3) . Although the data on the number of aircraft fi nanced are not complete, there are no distortions with respect to the place of production.
The recipients of EIB loans include governments, state banks, intermediary banks and project companies, which then lease the planes to airlines. Once again, the fi nancial benefi t of EIB fi nancing for the airlines results not only in a lower interest rate but also in the provision of guarantees. Funding from other sources for non-EU projects, such as from international banks or the ECA, produces signifi cantly higher costs. 22 As part of the WTO proceedings initiated in 2004, the US alleges that Airbus Industrie has benefi ted greatly from EIB fi nancing.
23

Indirect Support via Launch Aid
The development of new aircraft models entails tremendous development and launch costs, which, in the case of the A380, amounted to €11.9 billion, exceeding the market capitalisation of EADS at the time of development. In this and other cases, the development costs are likely to exceed the capabilities of private companies to raise capital. 24 The corresponding subsidies granted -Launch Aid or Reimbursable Launch Aid (RLA) -can be described as discounted loans from the public sector 
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mation on the amount of annual instalments up to 2013, this paper assumes a uniform distribution.
The A350 Project
For the development of the Airbus A350 XWB, the German government had put in its 2005 budget a precautionary measure authorising loans of €820 million. However, this was blocked due to the uncertain outcome of the WTO proceedings.
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Infrastructure Measures
Both the consortium member states and local governments at Airbus sites assist with infrastructure measures such as the expansion of Airbus manufacturing plants and airports. Thus, the Hamburg Senate committed to a runway extension at the Hamburg airport in connection with the production and fi nishing work of the A380 in Hamburg. This included the expansion of the Airbus factory by means of land reclamation in "Mühlenberger Loch", the extension of the existing runway to the north and south, and the related compensatory nature conservation measures for a total of €693.7 million. 33 In the opinion of the authorities, however, this would not constitute a subsidisation, as the city only exercised its sovereign task of land reclamation. 34 The developed land was leased to Airbus Deutschland GmbH. The fi rm, so it was argued, did not derive a direct benefi t that would have impacted prices or products.
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Nordenham in Lower Saxony is a region with high employment losses in the manufacturing industry, recording an unemployment rate of 12. 9% (1996-1998) , which was well above the national average.
36 Since 2000 , sup-32 Cf. BMF 2005 budget. 33 Cf. Hamburger Bürgerschaft, Drucksachen 16/4734, 16/5991, 17/202, 17/1778 , 17/364, 18/1512 . Information regarding the distribution of payments in the underlying period is not provided. The amount is reported only in aggregate form. It is assumed, for the purposes of this analysis, that the payments are spread evenly over the subsidisation period. 34 The extension of the runway is a so-called "special infrastructure", which is being leased by Airbus for 20 years. The constructed area provided is "specifi c", that is, due to special properties its use can be restricted to a particular company (industry). In the context of special infrastructure facilities, the city levies what is known as "economic rent". The level of such economic rent here is higher than the market rent. As a result of the increased interest rate, the investment will amortise in full within 20 years. In the UK, Launch Aid has been granted since 1982 and the enactment of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. Airbus Industrie has received such grants to fi nance the development of its aircraft models A320, A330/340 and A380. For the A380 project, the UK government provided Launch Aid in the amount of €806.4 million to develop the A380 aircraft wings. In the fi rst payout year 2001, a total of €210.9 million was already paid to Airbus UK.
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In addition to Airbus aircraft models, Launch Aid is also given to the UK manufacturer Rolls-Royce (RR) for the development of engines. Rolls-Royce, together with MTU Aero Engines and the two US companies Pratt & Whitney (P&W) and General Electrics (GE), is the main supplier of engines for Airbus and Boeing. The two newly developed RR engines TRENT 600 and TRENT 900, whose state support totals €684.6 million (£450 million), were approved by the European Commission and will be built into the A380. 29 Since the launch of the A320 in 1982, Airbus Industrie in the UK has received Launch Aid in the amount of €2.2 billion, of which Airbus has paid back around 65% thus far.
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The Spanish government has granted Launch Aid in the amount of €395 million to Airbus Industrie for the development of the A380 project.
31 Given the lack of infor- Table 5 ).
Military Funds
The funding of military programmes is not subject to WTO rules, which can provide a temptation to hide subsidies. Finding proof is diffi cult, as new military technologies can be partially adopted by the civilian sector and used in the development of new aircraft models. A close link between civil and military fi elds also results from the fact that the dominant military aircraft manufacturers in both the US and the EU also dominate the production of civil aircraft. The synergy between the two areas provides for high technological value and economies of scale, since overhead and fi xed costs (sunk costs), as they occur in R&D, can be amortised more quickly.
In 2003, EADS began expanding its own military division further. This included the development of the A400M military transport -also known as Future Large Aircraft (FLA) -by EADS subsidiary Airbus Military Company (AMC). The impetus for this move was the desire for independence from the US defence industry and the civil aircraft sector, which is subject to cyclical fl uctuations. 40 Following the procedure of the so-called Commercial Approach (CA), AMC pre-fi nances all development, series preparation and system costs. In addition to accrued interest charges for company-side pre-fi nancing, the fi xed price, which comes due only upon delivery, includes compensation for infl ation. The order book for the A400M, which listed orders for 197 aircraft in the preliminary agreement in 2001, has since been re- port for the city of Nordenham has been a structural measure as part of the framework for the joint task (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe, GA) to improve the regional economic structure. 37 GA programmes support structural change in specifi c German regions and are fi nanced by federal and regional governments. An investment subsidy under the GA-support programmes for the Airbus production plants in Nordenham amounted to €6.2 million in 2002. This infrastructure investment, which has fl owed into the Airbus project, is WTO-compliant, according to the BMWi.
Infrastructure projects have been funded in Toulouse as well. A 240-km road, connecting the city of Langon with the Airbus site at the airport Toulouse-Blagnac and specifi cally upgraded for the transport of A380 fuselage sections, was partly funded by the French government, which shouldered 43% of the total cost of €178 million. The road had become necessary because the capacity of the Airbus freighter Beluga was not suffi cient for A380 components. In accordance with the new transport concept, the individual parts are fi rst shipped by sea to Bordeaux from various European locations, then transferred to special roll-on/roll-off barges and taken to Langon. The rest of the way to Toulouse is then covered by lorry. The necessary upgrade of the Airbus 
